

Message Text

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P 112220Z AUG 75
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TO USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 188329

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 188329 ACTION NATO INFO ANATO
BELGRADE BUCHAREST BUDAPEST MOSCOW PRAGUE SOFIA WARSAW
MBFR VIENNA DATED 8 AUG 75
QUOTE

S E C R E T STATE 188329

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CSCE

SUBJECT: BRIEFING FOR NATO CHIEFS OF MISSION

REF: USNATO 4019

1. SUMMARY. ON AUGUST 7, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN, WITH
INR DIRECTOR HYLAND, GAVE ONE-HOUR BRIEFING IN DEPARTMENT
TO NATO CHIEFS OF MISSION ON PRESIDENT'S EUROPEAN TRIP.
REPRESENTATIVES FROM ALL ALLIANCE COUNTRIES WERE PRESENT
WITH EXCEPTION OF LUXEMBOURG, WHICH WAS REPRESENTED BY
NETHERLANDS CHARGE. QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD FOLLOWED
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BRIEFING BY HARTMAN AND HYLAND ON US VIEW OF HELSINKI
RESULTS AND CSCE IMPLEMENTATION, US-USSR BILATERALS AT
SUMMIT, AND PRESIDENT'S VISITS TO POLAND, BUCHAREST AND
BELGRADE. RESUME OF PROCEEDINGS FOLLOWS.

2. CSCE. RESULTS OF CONFERENCE WERE BETTER THAN WE HAD EARLIER ENVISAGED IN THAT WESTERN IDEAS, INCLUDING THOSE ON FREER MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND INFORMATION, WERE PRE-DOMINANT IN DISCUSSION. NOW THAT CONFERENCE IS OVER, US IS TURNING ATTENTION TO IMPLEMENTATION OF FINAL ACT AND TO NEXT STEPS IN OTHER AREAS. IN LATTER REGARD, US POSITION PUBLICLY AND IN BILATERALS AT HELSINKI WAS THAT THERE SHOULD NOW BE PROGRESS IN MBFR; WE ALSO DISCUSSED SALT IN MEETINGS

WITH SOVIETS AT SUMMIT.

3. US BELIEVES THERE SHOULD BE DISCUSSIONS IN NATO IN AUTUMN ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION. LOOKING AHEAD TO 1977 FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN BELGRADE, ALLIES MIGHT CONSIDER WHERE WE STAND NOW TO ESTABLISH REFERENCE POINT IN REGARD TO FURTHER ACTION, AND SHOULD DECIDE ON CSCE AREAS WHERE WE WISH TO PUSH FORWARD. PERHAPS INDIVIDUAL ALLIES WITH INTERESTS IN PARTICULAR SUBJECTS DURING CSCE COULD CONTINUE TO TAKE LEAD IN THOSE AREAS. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONTINUE CONTACT WITH NEUTRALS WITH WHOM WE HAVE MANY COMMON CSCE INTERESTS. US AND ALLIES CAN ALSO PRESS AHEAD ON BILATERAL BASIS USING, FOR EXAMPLE, ALREADY-ESTABLISHED AGREEMENTS AND COMMISSIONS WITH USSR AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO IMPLEMENT CSCE PROVISIONS ON CULTURE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. A SPECIFIC INSTANCE OF CSCE IMPLEMENTATION HAS ALREADY OCCURRED WITH SOVIET REFUSAL TO ISSUE MULTIPLE ENTRY-EXIT VISAS TO US NEWSMEN. OUR EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAS PRESENTED A NOTE TO SOVIETS STATING US IS PREPARED, UNDER TERMS OF CSCE, TO ISSUE MULTIPLE ENTRY-EXIT VISAS IF USSR RECIPROCATES.

4. BILATERALS WITH BREZHNEV. PRESIDENT AFFIRMED THAT WITH COMPLETION OF CSCE AND CRITICISM OF CONFERENCE IN US, WE EXPECT IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFERENCE PROMISES AND PROGRESS ON SALT AND MBFR. BREZHNEV RESPONDED IN POSITIVE, IF ONLY GENERAL, MANNER THAT USSR ALSO SEES PROGRESS

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AHEAD IN MBFR. SOVIETS MAY BE SOMEWHAT PUZZLED OVER AMOUNT OF CRITICISM OF CSCE AND DETENTE IN WEST AND MAY BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERING WHAT MOVE SHOULD BE TAKEN NEXT. IT STILL APPEARS, HOWEVER, THAT BREZHNEV HAS IN MIND SERIES OF FUTURE EVENTS -- SALT NEGOTIATIONS, US VISIT AND EUROPEAN AND SOVIET PARTY CONGRESSES. ON MIDDLE EAST, SOVIETS WERE CONCILIATORY, LISTENING TO WHAT WE HAD TO SAY AND PRESENTING THEIR STANDARD POSITION ABOUT THE NECESSITY OF GOING TO GENEVA BUT WITHOUT ANY PARTICULAR PRESSURE. MFN AND EMIGRATION AROSE BRIEFLY, BUT BREZHNEV DID NOT RESPOND POSITIVELY TO SUGGESTION THAT MOVEMENT ON THEIR SIDE WOULD HELP. AT SECOND BILATERAL WITH SOVIETS MORNING AFTER CONFERENCE CLOSED, BREZHNEV, WHO HAD FAITHFULLY ATTENDED

ALL CSCE EVENTS AND PARTICIPATED IN SEVERAL BILATERALS,
APPEARED TIRED.

5. PRINCIPAL TOPIC OF SECOND MEETING WAS SALT, WHICH BREZHNEV INDICATED WAS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE. AFTER REVIEW OF VARIOUS SALT ISSUES, IT WAS DECIDED THAT US AND USSR WERE CLOSE ENOUGH ON FIVE TECHNICAL, SECONDARY ISSUES -- WHICH AMBASSADOR JOHNSON MAY ELABORATE IN NATO

IN THE WEEKS AHEAD -- TO INDICATE ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE, WHILE REMANDING THESE ISSUES TO NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA TO WORK OUT DETAILS. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT OUR PUBLIC COMMENTS IN HELSINKI ON SALT PROGRESS WERE MADE. US STRESSED FOUR ISSUES WHERE DIFFERENCES REMAIN -- MIRV VERIFICATION, CRUISE MISSILES, THE BACKFIRE BOMBER, AND DEFINITION OF LIGHT AND HEAVY MISSILES. BREZHNEV'S DEMEANOR SEEMED TO INDICATE DISSATISFACTION WITH POSITION -- WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN TOO TOUGH -- PREPARED BY HIS COLLEAGUES. HE CHOSE NOT TO MAKE PREPARED PRESENTATION BUT INSTEAD SUGGESTED FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN GROMYKO AND SECRETARY KISSINGER TO WORK ON THESE PROBLEMS. ONE MEETING MIGHT OCCUR AT REGULAR UN SESSION (GROMYKO DOES NOT PLAN TO ATTEND SPECIAL SESSION.) SALT DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS MAY HAVE HAD TWO BENEFICIAL RESULTS: (1) MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES WERE CLARIFIED AT HIGHEST LEVEL; AND (2) AFTER HEARING US PRESENTATION, BREZHNEV MAY BE MORE AWARE THAT HARD POLITICAL DECISIONS, INCLUDING SOVIET CONCESSIONS, ARE NECESSARY TO MOVE
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AHEAD IN SALT. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT ON SALT BEFORE BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO THE US THIS YEAR; HE PROBABLY WOULD NOT COME WITHOUT IT.

6. VISITS TO EAST EUROPE. PRESIDENT'S VISITS TO POLAND, ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO COMMUNIST LEADERS WHO SHOW SOME DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY OR INDEPENDENCE FROM THE KREMLIN. DURING VISITS, DIFFERENCES WERE NOTED IN VIEWS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES CONGRESS WITH ROMANIANS MOST OUTSPOKEN IN OPPOSITION TO MEETING WHERE SOVIETS WOULD PLAY DOMINANT ROLE. THERE SEEMED TO BE AGREEMENT AMONG EE AND SOVIET LEADERS THAT ALL SHOULD AIM FOR CONSTRUCTIVE UN SESSION AND RATIONAL DEBATE, RATHER THAN POLEMICS AND STALEMATE.

A. POLES WERE MOST INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING ECONOMIC, AGRICULTURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL MATTERS. GIerek INDICATED POLAND IS INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS WITH USSR, WHILE IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH US AND WEST, INCLUDING FRG. HE MADE CLEAR THAT CSCE IS IMPORTANT STEP IN DETENTE PROCESS WHICH, IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF POLAND, IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT TO HIS COUNTRY.

B. CEAUSESCU SEEMED DETERMINED TO USE EVERY OCCASION
TO ILLUSTRATE ROMANIAN INDEPENDENCE AND ANTAGONISM
TOWARD SOVIET UNION. ROMANIANS WERE HIGHLY PLEASED
ABOUT PROGRESS OF US-ROMANIAN TRADE AGREEMENT IN CONGRESS
WHICH PLACES THEM IN BETTER POSITION THAN USSR.

C. YUGOSLAVS CLEARLY WISH TO EXHIBIT THEIR
INDEPENDENCE, LEADERSHIP IN NON-ALIGNED WORLD AND
CLOSE RELATIONS WITH US. TALKS WITH TITO CENTERED ON
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PARTICULARLY MIDDLE EAST. TITO
EXPRESSED IMPATIENCE WITH ISRAEL, NOTING STEP-BY-STEP
NEGOTIATING PROCESS HAD TAKEN TOO LONG, AND SAID SOME
ADVANCE SHOULD NOW BE FORTHCOMING FROM ISRAEL.
OTHERWISE, MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM SHOULD BE TAKEN UP IN
GENEVA. TITO (AS WELL AS SOVIET AND OTHER EE LEADERS)
TOOK SERIOUS NOTE OF OUR POSITION ON REDUCTION OF
US SUPPORT FOR UN IF ISRAEL IS SUSPENDED OR EXPelled.
TITO SAID HE DID NOT RULE OUT "SANCTIONS" AGAINST

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ISRAEL IN PRINCIPLE, BUT REJECTED ANY ACTION AGAINST
ISRAELIS AT THIS POINT. HE ADDED THAT FOREIGN
MINISTER MINIC WILL URGE MODERATION ON ISRAEL QUESTION
AT NON-ALIGNED FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN LIMA
LATER THIS MONTH. KISSINGER UNQUOTE

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